The Military Value of the Knight

I was in an argument the other day over the value of knights in high and late medieval warfare. A not very well thought out post challenged my creativity and I wrote a short essay refuting all points made attacking the knights. I thought some might find this interesting, not just for any military history facts they might learn from it but also from knowing what keeps me busy from time to time.

I omit the opening paragraph, but if you're interested you can read the rest of the debate HERE

Military history is not a study of "What type of soldier is best" or "Who was the greatest general", subjects this forum seems to broach with alarming regularity. We are dealing with humans, and humans are fallible. They can be impetuous, frightened, sleepy, or drunk. They might be hungry, or cold. They are not machines that do the same thing over and over and get the same result every single time.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say that some weapons were more successful versus some other weapons. A mass of pikes or goedendags would be effective at keeping enemies at a safe distance - yet if their flank was turned or archers were brought to bear on them, they could falter.
An important aspect of war is psychology, and often the side that first loses its head also loses the struggle.

Looking at the 13th century, it is easy to conclude that knights were the dominant factor on the Western European battlefield. Yet this is somewhat misleading. Throughout France, Phillipe Augustus set up communes to stimulate the quality of his infantry, and by the time of Bouvines he was able to call upon over 7000 urban militia type men. Infantry was not being neglected; it was just inferior in social standing to the knights or even mercenaries and was considered less important - but important enough for Philippe II to invest in it on a massive scale.
The battle of Bouvines, which misplacedgeneral briefly describes as "mainly Knight Vs. Knight" was a struggle where the French infantry gave way under pressure. The urban militia was still young and not experienced enough to withstand assaults not only of Imperial knights, but also of Flemish and Brabançon footsoldiers, at that time perhaps the most experienced in Western Europe, having seen active service as mercenaries for a long time.
Nevertheless, it were the French knights who regained the initiative and won the battle, not due to honourary exploits or valour, but because of their discipline. The Imperials, who had been made to force-march to the battlefield, were tired and strung out, while the French were in close ranks. The better disciplined French therefore broke through the enemy cavalry, and though a Brabançon schiltron formed and protected the fleeing Imperials, they too were run down by the French.
It was therefore a real victory where one side was outclassed by the other, not just a battle of attrition; many more victories such as these can be summed up, such as Muret, Lewes, Evesham, the Marchfeld, Worringen, Baesweiler, Ravenstein, Straelen, Montlhéry, etc etc. In all these knights were the victors thanks to superior discipline and drill.

There are too many battles mentioned to discuss them all, but actually many of misplaced's battles underline the importance of knights. Poitiers, for example is a prime example of knights winning; it wasn't a clear-cut longbow vs mounted knight battle, as people like to see; on the contrary. All but the first wave of the French army fought on foot, and the principal fighting force on the English side were not their longbowmen, but rather their Anglo-Gascon knights and men-at-arms. The single most decisive moment of the battle was actually caused by mounted knights, when the Captal de Buch with a group of mounted men-at-arms flanked the French attacking army and brought them into disarray. After this, the battle became a melee struggle where eventually the French king and his bold son Philippe surrendered - to a knight, Sir Denis de Morbecque.
This battle serves to underline the importance of knights in combat - their very versatility was what made them so valuable. Being able to conduct both mounted and infantry actions, as well as being well-trained in the martial arts, they were the elite of the army.
Another point not touched upon here is that many of the victories mentioned here were reversed. Kortrijk (not Courtrai; the Flemish won, at least show them the honour of using the actual placename rather than the French one) was followed by Mons-en-Pévèle, Kassel and Westrozebeeke; after Bannockburn came Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. The knights learned how to face these opponents and adjusted their tactics.

The English army during the Hundred Years War is used by the author to underline the point that the knight was fading. But he wasn't; society was changing, and this change was reflected in the composition of the army. The English army was a brutally effective combination of the knightly class with the middle class longbowmen (and billmen, to a lesser extent), and the result of a simultaneous peak of both upper and middle class society. French society peaked earlier, and only the upper class really peaked, making the French armies much more vulnerable; Flemish society had a smaller upper class and there the urban middle class was most successful. The Flemish case makes a good point as to how no single class can be effective on its own: after Kortrijk, their army was defeated by knights at Kassel and Westrozebeeke, suffering massive casualties; the Liège militia suffered the same fate at Othée.

The only point the author makes that stands is that knights alone could not win a battle, but surely this is common sense?